This article is republished from The Conversation, an independent and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts. Renata Keller is an associate professor of history at the University of Nevada, Reno.
Sixty-three years ago, President John F. Kennedy single-handedly brought the world back from the brink of nuclear war by staring down Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev over the Cuban missile crisis. At least, so goes a standard U.S.-centric interpretation of events.
But despite the narrative of presidential strength and American resolve saving the day, the truth is more complicated 鈥� and involved a wider cast of continental characters.
As an with a , I argue that when it comes to the Cuban missile crisis, it took a proverbial regional village to avert catastrophe. Indeed, the United States did not solve or experience the drama alone. Much as in geopolitics today, the Cuban missile crisis took place in a complicated environment where the entire hemisphere both reckoned with and helped shape the realities of American power and regional dominance.
Regional assistance during the crisis
On the evening of Oct. 22, 1962, Kennedy took to the airwaves and revealed to a live international audience that the Soviet Union had secretly capable of reaching most of the mainland U.S. and Latin America.
In a nationwide address, President John F. Kennedy publicly reveals details about Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.Throughout his speech, Kennedy consistently emphasized that the missiles threatened the security not just of the U.S. but of the entire hemisphere. And because the missiles were a regional threat, they required a regional solution. Kennedy called upon the Organization of American States, a regional body created in 1948 to coordinate hemispheric affairs, including security, to invoke the 鈥渋n support of all necessary action鈥� to remove the missiles.
U.S. regional neighbors responded immediately to Kennedy鈥檚 call for action.
During the crisis, Mexico and Brazil were the two Latin American countries that a peaceful resolution. The leaders of both countries were moderate leftists and had with the Cuban Revolution before the missile crisis. Mexico and Brazil were two of the few remaining nations in the Americas that still had official ties with Cuba and, as a result, their leaders could help facilitate shuttle diplomacy.
Mexico鈥檚 president, Adolfo L贸pez Mateos, sent a to Cuban President Osvaldo Dortic贸s as soon as he learned about the missiles. L贸pez Mateos made a special appeal 鈥渋n the name of the friendly relations that unite and have united our countries.鈥� He stated that he believed it was his duty to 鈥渃ordially call upon your government so that those bases are not used in any form whatsoever and the offensive weapons are withdrawn from Cuban territory.鈥� By communicating directly with the Cubans, Mexico鈥檚 president treated them as full participants in the crisis on their island, not as mere victims, puppets or observers.
Mexico鈥檚 government also helped in the waters around Cuba and clamped down on any pro-Cuban protests during the missile crisis. Mexico鈥檚 navy sent 10 ships to patrol the Yucatan Channel between Mexico and Cuba. The U.S. ambassador noted the lack of violent demonstrations in Mexico and attributed the peaceful public response to the 鈥�.鈥�
Like L贸pez Mateos, Brazilian President Jo茫o Goulart tried to use his country鈥檚 special relationship with Cuba to convince the Cubans to make concessions during the crisis. Goulart to Cuban leaders through his ambassador in Havana, the Cuban ambassador in Rio de Janeiro and Cuba鈥檚 representative to the United Nations. Through these channels, he tried to convince the Cubans to open their territory to an investigative U.N. commission.
Goulart also sent a special envoy to Havana who pleaded for a peaceful resolution. This mission was actually a , who had asked the Brazilians to use their special relationship with Cuba to serve as mediators and suggest to Cuban leader Fidel Castro that giving up the nuclear weapons could be the first step in improving Cuba鈥檚 relations with its neighbors. 鈥淔rom such actions many changes in the relations between Cuba and the OAS countries, including the U.S., could flow,鈥� the message promised.
Crafty diplomacy
Most importantly, Mexican and Brazilian leaders changed their position in international organizations in response to the Cuban missile crisis.
Prior to the crisis, these two countries had resisted all multilateral actions against Cuba and had abstained from Organization of American States votes that put sanctions on the island. But on Oct. 23, 1962, they changed their position and joined the to establish a quarantine around Cuba. The quarantine laid out a large zone where ships approaching the island could be intercepted and searched for offensive military equipment.
The OAS action provided the . Establishing the quarantine under the auspices of articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty made it a multilateral 鈥�.鈥� Had the U.S. acted alone, interdicting ships in international waters would have legally been considered a 鈥�,鈥� or act of war.
By voting in this manner, Latin American countries demonstrated their support not necessarily for the U.S. or U.S. imperialism, as , but for multilateralism. Latin American leaders were protecting their own countries, not just the U.S., when they demanded the removal of the Soviet missiles. The unanimous vote also helped the U.S. demonstrate to the rest of the world that other countries in the Americas agreed that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba posed an unacceptable threat.
Another Latin American country, Venezuela, not only joined the unanimous vote to establish the quarantine but also in it. Venezuela contributed airplanes, two destroyers and the country鈥檚 only submarine to the Inter-American Quarantine Force, a combined group of Latin American armed forces that constituted the southernmost part of the quarantine line. The Cuban missile crisis marked the first time in modern Venezuelan history that the country鈥檚 forces had participated in international military actions.
鈥淢y government will comply with each and every one of its international compromises,鈥� , 鈥渘ot only out of loyalty to written agreements in treaties that impose inevitable obligations, but also out of a sense of national survival.鈥�
Inevitable obligations and national survival
The Venezuelan president鈥檚 declaration about his country鈥檚 response to the crisis reminds Washington what it may be forsaking and risking with today鈥檚 current policy toward Latin America.
During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and Latin American leaders took their international obligations seriously and used international law to their advantage instead of defying it. In comparison, recent months have seen the Trump administration flout international norms by carrying out unilateral and .
Kennedy resisted the temptation to use preemptive airstrikes during the Cuban missile crisis because it would have violated international norms and at home and abroad. In avoiding extrajudicial violence and finding a peaceful, multilateral solution, Kennedy and his Latin American partners strengthened the rule of law and defended their national and international security.
During the crisis, the U.S.鈥檚 neighbors in Latin America helped Kennedy take a step back from the brink and find a peaceful solution. That the world avoided nuclear war in 1962 was a triumph of multilateralism, rather than U.S. unilateralism.
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